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TREATMENT OF MULTI-COURTS
JURISDICTION AGREEMENTS
An increasingly popular manner of drafting jurisdiction clauses in
cross-border contracts involves, the selection of the courts of more than
one jurisdiction. Traditionally, parties would submit all disputes to the
courts of a particular country under an exclusive jurisdiction agreement,
or agree that the transaction is subject to a particular jurisdiction' without
intending to create an obligation to proceed there and nowhere else. Of
late, the Singapore courts have encountered litigation over multi-courts
jurisdiction agreements.2 A common form involves the naming of a
particular court with one of the parties being given the option to proceed
anywhere else.
The Spectrum of Cases from Spiliada to The Eastern Trust
The most recent of these cases, Baiduri Bank Bhd v. Dong Sui Hung, is
of particular interest because the learned judge attempted to present a
summary of the approach towards the exercise of jurisdiction in a
spectrum of cases.4 On the one end were the cases involving no prior
jurisdiction agreement (the first scenario) in which the forum non
conveniens principles set out in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex
Ltd would apply; on the other were the cases dealing with exclusive
jurisdiction agreements (the second scenario) in which the Singapore
I This may in some circumstances be found to be merely declaratory but not have the
effect of obliging the parties to litigate in that jurisdiction and nowhere else: See, for
example, S&W Berisford v. New Hampshire Insurance [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 454.
2 PT Jaya Putra Kundur Indah v. Ang & Sons Investment Pte Ltd (Unreported, Suit
No. 395 of 1996); Bambang Sutrisno v. Bali International Finance Ltd [1999] 3 SLR
140; Baiduri Bank Bhd v. Dong Sui Hung [2000] 4 SLR 212.
3 [2000] 4 SLR 212.
4 Baiduri, at 216-222.
5 [1987] AC 460.
Where stay of an action is sought, the defendant, in establishing a primafacie case for
stay, must show that there is some other available forum having competent jurisdiction
in which the case may be more suitably tried for the interests of the parties and the
ends of justice. The plaintiff must then show that substantial justice will not be done
unless the application for stay is denied.
Where leave is sought by the plaintiff to serve out of jurisdiction, the plaintiff has to
show it is a 'proper case' for service out of jurisdiction under Order 11 rule 2(2),
Rules of Court (Cap 322), and it is a proper case when the forum is the natural
forum. The burden being the obverse of that in stay cases, where the plaintiff establishes
aprimafacie case for leave, the court will ask if justice demands that leave be denied.
(2001)
13 S.Ac.L.J. Treatment of Multi-Courts Jurisdiction Agreements
Court of Appeal in The Eastern Trust6 clearly enunciated the differences
in the approach, as compared with forum non conveniens cases. Perhaps
most significantly for our purposes, the Singapore Court of Appeal in
The Eastern Trust held that a distinction should be drawn between those
cases in which the parties knew or should have known at the time of
contract that they were agreeing to litigate disputes in a particular forum,
and those in which they could not easily have known. In the former cases,
the requirement that the party in breach of the jurisdiction agreement
show strong cause why the agreement should not be upheld should apply
with full rigour; in the latter, the burden on the party was less onerous.
Two main reasons are usually offered by the courts to justify the different
approach in cases involving jurisdiction agreements, as the Court in
Baiduri Bank suggested. One reason is contractual: Parties must generally
abide by their own agreement, and the focus of the courts is on the
construction of the nature and scope of the jurisdiction agreement. If, as
a matter of contractual interpretation, the parties have conceded to certain
disadvantages and inconveniences of proceeding in the contractual forum,
strong reasons are required by the party seeking to resist the proceedings
in a contractual forum when the party proceeding there is merely invoking
his contractual right. In the case in which the contractual forum is a
foreign court, jurisdictional considerations (the second reason) influence
the equation. As the Court noted in Baiduri Bank, the plaintiff (who was
the party in breach locally) would have, apart from the jurisdiction
agreement, established the jurisdiction of the local court. The contractual
6 [1994] 2 SLR 526.
The existence of an exclusive foreign jurisdiction agreement in this case was said to
create a strong primafacie case for granting the defendant's application for a stay of
the proceedings in Singapore. The plaintiff must show strong cause to persuade the
court to refuse to grant a stay. Regard may be had to the factors in the test laid down
by Brandon J in The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All ER 641, and first adopted in Amerco
Timbers [1977] 2 MLJ 181: The situation of the evidence on the issues of facts and the
effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between Singapore
and other courts; whether foreign law applied and whether it differed significantly
from Singapore law; the connections of the parties; whether the defendants genuinely
desired trial in the foreign country or were merely seeking procedural advantages;
whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court because
they would be deprived of security for their claim or be unable to enforce any judgment
obtained or be faced with a lime bar not applicable in Singapore or for political,
racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial.
In The Eastern Trust, it was further said that where the jurisdiction agreement is an
essential term of a freely negotiated contract, exceptional circumstances have to be
shown before the plaintiff is allowed to proceed in breach of the agreement. The
plaintiff must be taken to have conceded the inconvenience and disadvantages in
choosing the contractual forum and cannot easily be allowed to rely on those to make
his case for the refusal of a stay.
Singapore Academy of Law Journal
principle (in favour of the defendant) had to be balanced against the
right of the plaintiff to proceed locally, which he had established under
the lex fori. This, the Court noted, explained why the burden on the
plaintiff to resist a stay application in the face of an exclusive foreign
jurisdiction agreement was not as onerous as would have been under
usual contractual principles to avoid a contractual clause.7
It may be noted that the question could also arise when the local forum
is the contractual forum. The plaintiff who proceeds in the local forum is
merely invoking his contractual right, and should be allowed to do so.
On a contractual analysis, if the jurisdiction agreement in favour of the
local forum is interpreted as a designation of the local forum as the most
appropriate forum and a promise on the part of the defendant not to
object to the local forum's jurisdiction, then strong reasons are required
from the defendant when he seeks to stay the action in the local forum.
While the Court did not deal with the cases involving exclusive forum
jurisdiction agreements, it is submitted that jurisdictional considerations
should likewise influence the equation. On the one hand, it may be argued
that in addition to his contractual right to proceed locally, the contract
involves submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the local court.
The jurisdictional consideration would thus strengthen the plaintiff's case
for proceeding locally. However, it must not be forgotten that the
defendant may, under foreign jurisdictional law, have the right to proceed
in what would, apart from the jurisdiction agreement, be the natural forum
for the dispute. While technically the jurisdiction of the foreign court is
irrelevant to the assumption of jurisdiction by the local court, the right
of the defendant, which he has under the foreign procedural law, to
proceed in the foreign court should, by parity of reasoning, be borne in
mind. If the Court protects its own jurisdiction despite the contractual
agreement in favour of foreign courts, it should also accord some weight
to the otherwise legitimate jurisdiction of the foreign courts despite a
contractual agreement in favour of the local court.
Thus, whether the agreement is in favour of the local or a foreign court,
the following considerations are relevant: First, strong reasons are required
when a party seeks to act in breach of the contract which is interpreted
to amount to the designation of the appropriateness of the contractual
forum and a waiver of the objection to the jurisdiction of the contractual
forum on such ground; second, the strength of the case required to
persuade the Court to sanction the breach of the contract is mitigated by
jurisdictional considerations which may be in favour of a non-contractual
forum.
7 Baiduri, at 219, para 17.
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At this juncture, it may be queried whether the courts in The Eastern
Trust and other cases dealing with exclusive foreign jurisdiction
agreements (many of which also involved a foreign proper law) were
really employing the contractual analysis (the effect of which was to be
mitigated by the jurisdictional analysis) as the Court in Baiduri Bank
claimed. If the contractual analysis was the first consideration of these
courts, it may be asked why the scope, nature, and effect of the jurisdiction
agreements were not overtly tested by reference to the proper law of the
contract, which should govern issues of interpretation of contract and
contractual obligations. That the Court in Baiduri Bank would not dispute
that contractual interpretation was governed by the proper law may be
seen from its judgment.8 One possible reason why there was no lengthy
discussion of the proper law of the contract in these cases is that in the
absence of the proof of foreign law, foreign law was assumed to be the
same as local law. But if so, perhaps such reasoning could be more clearly
indicated in future cases. Similarly, if the strength of the "cause" required
is mitigated (or reinforced, depending on the situation) by jurisdictional
considerations, the fact that this is determined by the lexfori could also
be more clearly indicated.
Jurisdiction Clauses in Favour of Courts A, B and C
One category in the spectrum between forum non conveniens cases and
exclusive jurisdiction agreement cases was that involving "semi-exclusive
jurisdiction clauses" (the third scenario). These involved a submission to
the jurisdiction of several countries (assume one of these is Singapore),
without any specific right of election or option to either of the parties to
select which of those countries to proceed in. The Court held that the
Amerco Timbers test9 was inappropriate in such a situation and it was
more correct to apply the forum non conveniens principles. Neither party
would be in breach in choosing to proceed in one of the contractual fora,
but the defendant who wishes to proceed in one of the contractual fora
other than Singapore has to show that the other forum is clearly and
distinctly more appropriate than Singapore in his application for a stay.
Several comments may be made.
It is not immediately apparent why the Amerco Timbers/(Eastern Trust)
analysis is deemed inapplicable. One possibility is that such agreements
are in reality not better than ordinary non-exclusive jurisdiction
agreements in favour of one forum. Possibly, when parties state that they
submit to the jurisdiction of courts A, B and C, they are doing no more
8 Baiduri, at 222, para 28.
9 Amerco Timbers v Chataworth [1977] 2 MLJ 181. The test is adopted in The Eastern
Trust.
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than in the case when they non-exclusively submit to court A (being one
of the many courts in the world).
It was probably not the Court's intention to treat the third scenario of
cases as being similar to cases involving non-exclusive jurisdiction
agreements. If indeed the Court was of the view that the clause was similar
to a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, the Court presumably would not
have held that the forum non conveniens analysis applied because the
Singapore Court has held that the S&W Berisford "strong case" approach
applied for non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements.' A party desiring to
stay an action in a contractual forum in the case where there was a
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement had to show a strong case why the
contractual right to sue in the contractual forum should not be recognised
and the plaintiff had to sue elsewhere. The contractual designation, albeit
non-exclusive, created a "strong prima facie case" that the jurisdiction
was an appropriate one to which neither party to the contract could object
as inappropriate as they had both implicitly agreed it was appropriate."
This, however, brings us to the next question. If indeed the Singapore
Court's approach to a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of
court A is to require "strong reasons" from the party desiring to proceed
in a non-contractual forum, it may be questioned why semi-exclusive
jurisdiction agreements do not call for the same kind of analysis. Insofar
as semi-exclusive jurisdiction agreements designate for the exclusive
jurisdiction of courts A, B or C, as and when one court is selected by
one party, it would seem that the forum non conveniens analysis is
inappropriate. It must be noted that for non-exclusive jurisdiction
agreements, the courts have required "strong reasons" despite what ought
to be treated as the implicit option of the parties to proceed anywhere
10 Although these two cases, PTJaya and Bambang (cited at footnote 2), involved multi-
court clauses, the Singapore Court treated the clauses in question (or part of the clause
in Bambang's case as the Court apparently broke the clause up into two parts for the
purpose of analysis) as non-exclusive, and thus the proposition is stated as such in the
text accompanying this footnote.
It is also submitted that the S&W Berisford approach technically does not fall within
the rubric of the Spiliadaforum non conveniens analysis, as a strong case needs to be
shown when a party seeks to stay the action in a contractual (albeit non-exclusive)
forum, and this is closer to the approach towards exclusive jurisdiction clauses. In this
regard, this approach may be contrasted with the approach of the Singapore High
Court in Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v. Hartadi Angkosubroto [1999] 2
SLR 427, which is probably the best example of a straightforward application of the
Spiliada approach in the context of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. There, the
High Court did not attach any special weight to a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in
favour of the courts of New York but allowed a stay on the grounds of forum non
conveniens nonetheless as Singapore had little connection with the dispute.
1 Supra, footnote 1, at 463. Such a decision for a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is
queried. See, infra, footnote 27.
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else in the world. The analysis should apply a fortiori to semi-exclusive
jurisdiction agreements (whatever they are called) when the parties at
most only have the option to proceed in one of the other named courts,
in the case where the party selects one of the contractual fora. In contrast,
when the stay application is heard before a non-contractual forum, the
agreement should be treated as if it were exclusively in favor of courts
A, B and C: Exceptional circumstances amounting to strong cause should
still be shown, even though the burden imposed may not be as high as in
a case where the agreement was exclusively in favour of one court. It is
acknowledged that this approach in such a multi-courts jurisdiction
agreement case when the party is proceeding before the non-contractual
Singapore forum is indeed suggested by the Court in an earlier part of
the judgment.'2 In holding the forum non conveniens approach to be
applicable to the third scenario, the Court was not dealing with cases
involving a breach of contract. The criticism remains, however, that if
the courts have required a strong case to be shown why the party should
not be allowed to proceed in a contractual forum in a case involving a
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, then it is hard to see why the Court
in Baiduri Bank should require that the party selecting one of three
contractual fora show that the selected forum is clearly and distinctly
more appropriate than the other two. For consistency with the cases
involving non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, if indeed the mere naming
of a contractual forum may be taken to be a designation of it as more
appropriate than other fora (and presumably an agreement not to object
to the jurisdiction of the contractual forum), the party resisting the action
in a contractual forum should not, in the absence of strong reasons, be
heard to object that it is less appropriate than the other two contractual
fora.
That said, this writer has criticised elsewhere the approach that treats
the mere naming, without more, of a contractual forum as the designation
of that forum as appropriate.' 3 If, indeed, the Court in Baiduri Bank had
12 Baiduri, at 220:
"Thus the severity of the burden cast on the plaintiff when resisting a stay application
is not necessarily the same under all factual circumstances. In my judgment, the burden
imposed on the plaintiff to establish 'exceptional circumstances' will also depend on
the nature and scope of the exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause. Where the jurisdiction
clause provides for many foreign countries to have 'exclusive' jurisdiction, then the
circumstances to establish a strong cause to resist a stay application action will be less
stringent than if the exclusive jurisdiction is limited to only one country. For argument
sake, if the jurisdiction clause provides that 20 foreign countries in the world may
have jurisdiction, then the court in Singapore obviously will not view the 'exclusivity'
of these 20 foreign jurisdictions with as much importance to the parties as opposed to
that where the parties have chosen only one foreign country to have exclusive
jurisdiction. The plaintiff will not have as onerous a burden to discharge when resisting
a stay application in the face of a 'not-so-exclusive' foreign jurisdiction clause."
13 See text accompanying footnotes 28 and 29.
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required the party seeking action in one contractual forum to show that
it was more appropriate than the other contractual fora because the
naming of a forum could not, without more, be taken as the designation
of that forum as more appropriate, then its decision is to be praised.
Perhaps this could also have been stated more expressly so that these
principles would serve as a better guide for future cases.
Jurisdiction Clauses in Favour of Courts A, B and C, with a Specific
Right of One Party to Select Any of these Fora
The final scenario involved semi-exclusive jurisdiction agreements in which
there was an express submission to the courts of several countries
(including Singapore), but with a special or specific right given to the
plaintiff, but not the defendant, to select any one of these specified
countries in which to institute proceedings. The Court held that in such
cases, when the plaintiff invoked what was merely his contractual right
to proceed in Singapore, the burden must be on the defendant to show
strong cause or exceptional circumstances amounting to strong cause. This
involved the adoption of the Amerco Timbers test but with the burden
of proof reversed (since it involved a contractual choice of the local, and
not foreign, forum).
The approach toward the last scenario puts the agreements on the same
footing as exclusive jurisdiction agreements. This may be explained based
on the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius: The express right of
the plaintiff to select any one of the specified countries to institute
proceedings would mean that the defendant neither has the right to
select,' 4 nor perhaps, 8 in the absence of strong reasons, to object to the
plaintiff's chosen forum.
In such a case where, say, three courts are specified, it should probably
not be argued that The Eastern Trust caution against applying its principles
with full rigour in cases where the contractual forum was not and could
not easily have been known in advance is applicable. The reason for the
cautious attitude is probably to guard against the situation where the
parties could not be said to have genuinely conceded to the inconvenience
and disadvantages of suing in the contractual forum, thus making it rather
too harsh to apply the principles with full rigour. In a case in which
three courts are specified, while the defendant may not have known in
advance which of the three courts would be chosen by the plaintiff, he
could be taken to have conceded to the inconvenience and disadvantages
14 This is the conclusion of the English Court of Appeal when dealing with a similar
clause in Continental Bank N.A. v. Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 505 at 509.
15 This is elaborated upon and qualified later. See text accompanying footnote 21.
(2001)
13 S.Ac.L.J. Treatment ofMulti-Courts Jurisdiction Agreements
in proceeding in all of the three fora. However, it is theoretically possible
to specify a larger number of courts with the same express right given to
the plaintiff to select any of these courts. If this is done, then while the
Amerco Timbers/(Eastern Trust) test may apply, bearing in mind this
Court's earlier remark on the comparative exclusivity (or lack thereof)
of an agreement in favour of 20 countries, the burden imposed should be
different. This would be so even in the case when the plaintiff merely
acts within his contractual right by suing in a contractual forum. On a
contractual analysis, while in theory the counter-argument could be made
that the parties could be taken to have conceded to the inconvenience
and disadvantages of proceedings in any of these countries, it must be
borne in mind that the upholding of jurisdiction agreements through
insisting on a proceeding in the contractual forum is not a purely
contractual matter. That the concerns go beyond contract law to the
court's discretion in the exercise of the jurisdiction is well-accepted, and
explains why the factors pointing to strong cause, as enunciated in the
line of cases up to The Eastern Trust, are factors pertaining to the
appropriateness and justice of the forum.
The argument applies a fortiori when it concerns a non-exclusive
jurisdiction agreement that allows one party to proceed in any forum in
the world. Obviously, the choice of the party would in practice be limited
to a number of unnamed fora: Even forum shopping is undertaken with
a view to choosing a forum that is favourable in terms of its application
of substantive law or procedural and other advantages or in which the
defendant has assets. But that the party would in practice only want to
proceed in a limited number of unnamed fora should not make a
significant difference to the analysis.
Application of the Analysis in Baiduri Bank
The comparative analysis of the four scenarios was embarked upon by
the Court with the hope that "it will be clearer which scenario best fits
the factual circumstances of this case and the correct test to apply will
then be apparent"6 The test in the final scenario was found to be
applicable to the clause in question in Baiduri Bank. 7
Before moving on to the test, it may be noted that the Singapore Court
held that the relevant clause must be construed in accordance with the
express choice of law, which was the law of Brunei. It would thus seem
that the Singapore Court treated the construction of the clause as a
16 Baiduri, at 216.
/ Baiduri, at 224. The Court said: "Accordingly, the test to be applied to decide on a
question of stay is that which I have alluded to in the last scenario."
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question of interpretation of contract, governed by the proper law of the
contract (which in this case was the law of Brunei). The Singapore Court
then said that the clause had been construed by the High Court of Brunei
which found that it did not confer exclusive jurisdiction but gave the
Bank a right to proceed in all other courts of competent jurisdiction.
The Singapore Court held that issue estoppel arose on the point of
construction of the jurisdiction clause. Even if issue estoppel did not arise,
the Singapore Court held that it would decide similarly on the question
of construction.' However, that the bank was not in breach of contract
in suing in Singapore does not necessarily mean, on a contractual analysis,
that the guarantors acted in breach in seeking a stay in Singapore. The
guarantors would only be acting in breach in seeking a stay in Singapore
if the contract could be interpreted as a waiver of any objection on the
ground of forum non conveniens to the forum selected by the bank.
Further, it may be noted that the Singapore Court need not necessarily
have proceeded with the contractual analysis alone. Jurisdictional
considerations should always be relevant. The question should be asked
whether the Court of Brunei had jurisdiction according to Bruneian
procedural law, whether by virtue of submission, or otherwise. If so, the
right of the guarantors, under Bruneian procedural law, to proceed in
the Court of Brunei should be borne in mind."
The clause stated that the (Singaporean) guarantors irrevocably submitted
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Brunei but that it was open to the
bank to enforce the guarantee in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
When the bank sought to enforce the guarantee in Singapore, the
guarantors applied, inter alia, for a stay of the proceedings in Singapore.
Judicial Commissioner Chan Seng Onn held that the clause in question
was a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause from the bank's perspective. Its
purpose was not to limit the bank to instituting proceedings in Brunei,
but indeed gave the bank a specific right to sue anywhere else in the
world. Such a clause, the Court held, was obviously to facilitate the bank's
proceedings in any jurisdiction in which the guarantors were found to
have assets, regardless of the connecting factors that may link the dispute
to the jurisdiction. 0 As the guarantors had irrevocably given the bank
the option to sue anywhere else, regardless of whether the matter at hand
had connecting factors with the chosen jurisdiction, they had to show
strong cause why the bank should not proceed in Singapore.
Several questions arise.
While the Court did not expressly say that the fourth scenario provided
the best fit, it referred to the test in the fourth scenario as being applicable.
18 Baiduri, at 222.
J9 See text of paragraph immediately after footnote 7.
20 Baiduri, at 224.
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It may be asked whether this clause is analogous to the clause in the
fourth scenario. First, it is clearly less exclusive than a clause in favour of
named countries A, B and C in any of which the plaintiff but not the
defendant is given a specific right to choose to proceed. In such a case, it
may be said that the defendant should not be allowed to object when the
plaintiff selects any of the named countries in which to proceed,
presumably because there was an agreement not to object. The argument
should apply with less force in the case in which the plaintiff is allowed
to proceed anywhere in the world. It would seem to go rather too far
(though it is theoretically possible) to view the clause in favour of
unnamed courts of the world as an agreement to waive any objection to
the exercise of jurisdiction of any of the courts in the world that was
subsequently selected. Even if it does amount to such a waiver,
jurisdictional considerations may impinge on the equation. And if the
clause did not amount to a waiver of the objection to jurisdiction, then it
would seem that the defendant was not acting in breach of contract in
seeking a stay. If strong cause is required, it is not because there is a
breach of contract. If it is required because jurisdictional considerations
in that selected forum somehow strengthen the plaintiff's contractual right
to proceed in any forum in the world, this should be explained.
Second, while it is plausible that if the plaintiff selected Brunei, the
defendants should be made to show strong cause if the defendants desired
a stay in Brunei,2 it does not necessarily follow from the right of the
plaintiff to proceed anywhere else that the defendants should be made
to show strong cause when the plaintiff proceeds anywhere else. If the
clause evinced the contractual intention of the defendants to be bound
in the absence of strong cause wherever sued, it would have been better
to express the clause simply as one in which the defendants irrevocably
submitted to the jurisdiction of any court in the world in which the
plaintiffs elected to proceed in. Had it been so phrased, the Court may
have been more reluctant to apply the Amerco Timbers/(Eastern Trust)
approach. Yet the very holding of the Court could reasonably be said to
be based on an inference of such a concession on the part of the
defendants.
It may be noted that the clause in Baiduri Bank is similar to that
considered in several English cases. Of these, the Court had referred to
Justice Saville's judgment in Commercial Bank of the Near East plc v. A,
B, C and D.22The clause in Commercial Bank stated that the guarantor
submitted to the jurisdiction of the English courts but that it was open to
2J Perhaps because the defendants should be taken to have clearly conceded, as a matter
of contract, to the inconvenience and disadvantages of being sued there.
22 [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep 319.
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the bank to enforce the guarantee in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The bank proceeded in England. Justice Saville found the clause to be a
non-exclusive jurisdiction clause " but said that it made little difference
to the principle that the court would hold the parties to their bargain in
the absence of strong reasons to the contrary. If this part of the judgment
is applied, it may be noted that there is a factual distinction in Baiduri
Bank's case. In Commercial Bank, the bank proceeded in the named
forum, and as argued,28 strong reasons must be shown why it should not
be allowed to do so. In Baiduri Bank, the bank proceeded in a forum
that was selected from all the possible fora in the world, and it may be
that Commercial Bank's principle is not directly applicable.
Another comment is that Baiduri Bank's holding, at first blush, goes
further than the Singapore Court of Appeal's holding in the earlier case
of Bambang Sutrisno v. Bali International Finance Ltd.26 In Bambang, there
was a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Indonesian courts,
coupled with a contractual right of the respondent to proceed in any
competent court and an agreement by the appellant to waive any objection
on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Court of Appeal held that
where the post-contract selection of Singapore as the forum was
concerned, the situation was analogous to that of an exclusive jurisdiction
clause in favour of the forum such that the Amerco Timbers/Eastern Trust
test was applicable. A crucial difference between the clause in Bambang
and that in Baiduri Bank is the appellant's express waiver in Bambang
of any objection to the post-contract selection on the ground of forum
non conveniens. While some comment27 may be made as to the desirability
of the approach in Bambang, the further agreement of the appellant
makes the application of the Amerco Timbers/Eastern Trust test apparently
more justifiable in Bambang than in Baiduri Bank. As the appellant in
Bambang had expressly agreed to waive any objection as a matter of
contract, strong cause must be shown why the appellant should
nonetheless be allowed to object. The waiver of any objection on the
23 This classification is questionable, but perhaps it is not fruitful to focus on this alone,
but rather, one should focus on the substantive holding of the court. It may be noted
that the English Court of Appeal in Continental Bank N.A. v. Aeakos Compania
Naviera SA [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 505, faced with a similar clause, chose not to classify
it as exclusive or non-exclusive. However, the Court did say that the borrowers in that
case were unilaterally bound and could not complain when the bank proceeded in
England (at 509).
2 Supra, footnote 22 at 321.
25 See text accompanying footnote 21. Similarly, in Continental Bank N.A. v. Aeakos
Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 505, the bank selected the named
contractual forum.
26 [1999] 3 SLR 140.
27 The writer has dealt with this elsewhere. See Tan Seow Hon, "A New-Found
Significance for Non-exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements?" [2000] SJLS 298 326 at 315
318.
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ground of forum non conveniens could suggest a contractual intention to
designate any chosen forum as the natural forum. There was no such
contractual waiver in Baiduri Bank. In defence of Baiduri Bank, it may
be argued that the implicit denial of any right of the defendants to proceed
anywhere else necessarily means that the defendants could not object to
the plaintiff's selected forum, otherwise the clause is meaningless. The
counter-argument is: it may simply mean that in the limited number of
cases where the defendants are the ones instituting a proceeding, the
defendants have no choice but to institute it in Brunei. But the defendants
would not be barred from objecting to the comparative appropriateness
over Brunei of the plaintiff's selected forum in cases in which the plaintiff
begins the proceeding.
The Approach towards Multi-Courts Jurisdiction Agreements?
All that said, it is nonetheless noteworthy that the Court in Baiduri Bank
focused on the commercial purpose of such a jurisdiction agreement in
coming to the decision as to its effect. This writer has submitted elsewhere
that in considering the effect that should be accorded to jurisdiction
agreements, the courts in employing the contractual analysis should be
astute to the intentions of the parties in entering into such agreements.2 s
28 The writer has argued elsewhere in relation to the approach towards non-exclusive
jurisdiction agreements that this should turn on what the court deemed to be the
intention of the parties, as inferred from the facts. See Tan Seow Hon, "A
New-Found Significance for Non-exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements?" [2000] SJLS
298 326.
Briefly, the writer argued that only such a focus on the inferred intention would justify
the finding that a non-exclusive choice of a jurisdiction would result in the party desiring
to proceed in a non-contractual forum having to show strong reasons why he should
be allowed to do so. Under the Spiliada analysis, leave is granted when the forum is
the natural forum, and stay granted when the defendant shows that some other forum
is clearly and distinctly more appropriate. That the party desiring to proceed in a
non-contractual forum in a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement case has to show strong
reasons, means that the courts have implicitly found that the non-exclusive jurisdiction
agreement amounted to a designation of the contractual forum as the natural forum,
rather than merely an appropriate forum amongst several possibly appropriate fora. If
the chosen local forum was merely an appropriate forum amongst several possibly
appropriate fora, then surely it would be sufficient in a stay case that the defendant
showed that there was a clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum by the Spiliada
analysis, rather than the 'strong reasons' analysis traditionally required for exclusive
jurisdiction agreements. Similarly, in a leave case, the non-exclusive jurisdiction
agreement in favor of the local forum - if that was merely a designation of the local
forum as an appropriate forum, rather than the natural forum - would not create a
strong prima facie case for leave such that the defendant would have to show strong
reasons why leave should not be given. This was because under the Spiliada analysis,
that the court is a natural forum is not enough for leave to be granted. The court has
to be the natural forum. It makes sense that if strong reasons are needed, it was
because the court inferred from the circumstances that the parties intended to designate
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Briefly, this writer suggested that the courts should ask if the parties
intended merely to submit to a particular jurisdiction so that the court
could find jurisdiction to exist based on contractual submission, or whether
they intended to do more. In cases in which jurisdiction exists at the
outset 29 apart from the contractual submission, it may be that the parties
in further adopting a jurisdiction agreement in favour of that court could
be taken to have designated the contractual forum as the natural forum
such that neither party could object to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
contractual forum. In such cases, the party desiring to proceed in a
non-contractual forum may have to show strong reasons why such
proceeding should be allowed. In cases where the agreement merely
established the existence of the jurisdiction of a particular court
(as opposed to designating it as the natural forum), it may be more
desirable to employ the forum non conveniens approach which allows
one to consider all the usual factors in deciding the comparative
appropriateness of the various contending fora.
Further, the principles for requiring strong reasons - whether they are
based on a contractual analysis which focused on upholding the parties'
contractual designation of particular fora as appropriate, and how the
jurisdictional considerations apart from contract influence the equation -
could be made more express in future cases. This would also clarify the
question of the governing law. If the analysis is contractual, the proper
law should govern the interpretation of the agreement and its effect. If
the analysis is jurisdictional, as long as the proper law deems that
jurisdiction agreement to be valid and to cover the substantive dispute in
question, the effect of the jurisdiction agreement in tilting the balance in
favour of particular fora is a question for the lex fori.
The approach toward multi-courts jurisdiction agreements should be along
similar lines. To an extent, the preceding comments on the judgment in
Baiduri Bank were made in view of the existing regime, which the Court
in Baiduri Bank faced, which classified agreements as exclusive or
non-exclusive. To take the criticisms further, it is submitted that such
classification may actually confuse more than help, especially if the
the contractual forum as the most appropriate, or the natural, forum.
Such an inference of intention was justified if there was no need for the parties to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court through an agreement (because jurisdiction
already clearly existed apart from the agreement), such that the agreement must mean
something more. In these cases, it could mean that the agreement amounted to a
designation of the contractual forum as the natural forum.
29 For example, by virtue of the contract being made as a result of an essential step
taken in Singapore, or governed by Singapore law, if the forum in question is Singapore.
These are some of the grounds of discretionary jurisdiction under Order 11 rule 1(d)
of the Rules of Court.
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agreements could be exclusive from the point of view of one party and
non-exclusive from the point of view of the other party. Indeed, in
Continental Bank v. Aeakos,' the English Court of Appeal, faced with a
clause similar to that in Balduri Bank, declined to embark on such a
classification. Rather, considering that the borrowers in that case had
irrevocably submitted to the jurisdiction of the English courts, they were
unilaterally bound to proceed in the English courts, and could not object
when sued in England by the bank. As argued, the applicable principles
may possibly be different if the bank had chosen to proceed anywhere
else, even though they had an option to do so.
In any event, if strong reasons must always be shown by the party
proceeding in a non-contractual forum even in the case of simple
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements in favour of one court, classification
of agreements as exclusive or non-exclusive may not serve any useful
purpose today. Further, the difference in the burden to show strong
reasons may not be significantly different in the two cases. Even if the
burden ought in principle to be different, to say that there is a difference
in burden, when the same factors3 ' in the line of cases leading up to The
Eastern Trust are considered, is somewhat abstract and would not be
determinative of the factual holding in the varied cases that are heard.
If so, the burden to show strong reasons in a multi-courts jurisdiction
agreement case should simply be expressed as a question of degree,
depending on various factors. The Court in Baiditri took a laudable step
in isolating some of these factors in its categorisation within its spectrum
of cases.
It is submitted that factors of especial relevance in a multi-courts
jurisdiction agreement case are:
(a) the number of courts specified in the jurisdiction agreement;
(b) whether a specific right is accorded one party to proceed in any
forum, and whether the right is accorded to choose amongst
the named fora, or additionally, to choose amongst any other
court in the world;
(c) if one party is given a specific right to choose any other forum,
whether the party had selected the named forum or an unnamed
forum;
(d) the true implication of the right to proceed in a particular forum
- whether it amounts only to submission to the forum, or
additionally may be taken to be a waiver of the objection to
the exercise of jurisdiction by that forum;
30 Supra, footnotes 23 and 25.
3-1 This refers to the factors in The Eleftheria. Supra, footnote 6.
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(e) the forum (or fora) to which, apart from the contract,
jurisdictional considerations point, and how, if at all, such
considerations affect the strength of the case that must be shown
by the party seeking to proceed in a non-contractual forum or
to stay the action in a contractual forum.
Note for Practitioners?
It may be asked whether the suggestion for courts to infer or even deem
the parties' intended effect of jurisdiction agreements according to the
circumstances of the case is naive. Often, the jurisdiction clause is just
one of the many terms in the contract, and, (with respect) in many
contracts, possibly inserted by following precedents in the law firm's
database, without meticulous thought as to whether jurisdiction existed
apart from the contract.
It is submitted, nonetheless, that it is desirable for the courts to infer or
deem the intention of the parties based on the choice of wording and the
circumstances of the case. Based on such inferred or deemed intention,
the courts could then proceed to determine the effect of the agreement
in view of the various factors suggested in relation to multi-courts
jurisdiction agreements.
As for the practitioner drafting the agreement for clients, there is no
reason why the practitioner should not clarify the intention of the parties
by expressly stating that the party or parties are conceding to the
inconvenience and disadvantages of suing in particular fora in a
multi-courts jurisdiction agreement case, or that they are agreeing to waive
any objection to the exercise of jurisdiction by any of the fora.
Some uncertainty presently surrounds even the relatively common
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, and the uncertainty is only
compounded by the increased use of a variety of multi-courts agreements.
The courts could develop the jurisprudence in this area by enunciating
the effect of the use of such agreements in view of the factors suggested.
The Court in Baiduri Bank took a first step towards this by attempting
to categorise the possible agreements in a spectrum. It is suggested that
an analysis focusing on the various factors to be considered in what is
ultimately a question of degree may be more fruitful than any
categorisation which, in view of limited human foresight, would be
non-exhaustive anyway. With time, the parties would know with some
certainty the effect of incorporation of such agreements.
TAN SEOW HON*
LLB (NUS); LLM (Harvard); Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University
of Singapore. I am grateful to my colleague, Associate Professor Yeo Tiong Min, for
his comments. All views are mine alone.
(2001)
